This page will contain new posted chapters for my in-press (Cambridge University Press) book. The book seeks to defend, obviously enough, a welfarist and (roughly) consequentialist approach to the basic moral minimum. I argue that this approach is superior to competitor approaches characterized in terms of human subsistence, basic capabilities, basic needs, and views that define the importance of the basic minimum in terms of human rights. Furthermore, this book (especially Chapter Two) offers a novel and compelling theory of well-being that solves, or so I claim, many substantial worries about welfarist basic minimums that have motivated its important, though erroneous, rivals.
Chapter One is mostly critical. Chapter Two offers a welfarist theory of the basic minimum. Chapter Three discusses the problem of adaptive preferences. Chapter Four explores the importance of the basic minimum relative to other welfare achievements. Chapter Five argues for a teleological approach to the basic minimum, and against a dominant rights-based approach. Chapter Six responds to a number of classic objections to welfarism.
Please note that the chapters available here are un-proofed. Please use these to get a flavor for the book; any citations should wait for the printed version.