This page will contain new posted chapters for my in-progress mansucript. The book seeks to defend, obviously enough, a welfarist and consequentialist approach to the basic moral minimum. I argue that this approach is superior to competitor approaches characterized in terms of human subsistence, basic capabilities, basic needs, and views that define the importance of the basic minimum in terms of human rights. Furthermore, this book (especially Chapter Two) offers a novel and compelling theory of well-being that solves, or so I claim, many substantial worries about welfarist basic minimums that have motivated its important, though erroneous, rivals.
Chapter One is mostly critical. Chapter Two offers a theory of well-being. Chapter Three refines this theory of well-being, defines a welfarist basic minimum, and responds to objections. Chapter Four explores the importance of the basic minimum in contrast with welfare achievements below the basic minimum. Chapter Five argues for a particular weight of the basic minimum against achievements above the basic minimum. Chapter Six argues that we ought to be consequentialists, at least as concerns our oblibations toward the basic minimum.