Displacing blame over the ingroup’s harming of a disadvantaged group can fuel moral outrage at a third-party scapegoat

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HIGHLIGHTS

• We examined how moral outrage can result from displaced blame for ingroup harmdoing.
• Salient ingroup harmdoing leads people to blame a viable alternative harmdoer.
• The ability to blame scapegoat for ingroup harmdoing evoked moral outrage.
• Inability to blame scapegoat for ingroup harmdoing evoked collective guilt.
• Outrage and guilt mediated reparative and retributive action, respectively.

Abstract

Integrating research on intergroup emotions and scapegoating, we propose that moral outrage toward an outgroup perceived to be unjustly harming another outgroup can represent a motivated displacement of blame that reduces collective guilt over ingroup harm-doing. We tested this hypothesis by manipulating the purported cause of working-class Americans’ suffering (ingroup cause vs. unknown cause vs. outgroup cause) and whether a potential scapegoat target (i.e., illegal immigrants) was portrayed as a viable or nonviable alternative source of this harm. Supporting hypotheses, participants primed with ingroup culpability for working-class harm (versus other sources) reported increased moral outrage and support for retributive action toward immigrants when immigrants were portrayed as a viable source of that harm, but reported increased collective guilt and support for reparative action when immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable source of that harm. Effects on retributive and reparative action were differentially mediated by moral outrage and collective guilt, respectively.

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Introduction

When members of a socially advantaged group learn of illegitimate harm perpetrated against a relatively disadvantaged group, they experience distinct emotions depending on the perceived source of the harm (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Perceived harm perpetrated by the ingroup can elicit feelings of collective guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), whereas harm perpetrated by a third party (distinct from both the ingroup and harmed outgroup) can elicit feelings of moral outrage (Haidt, 2003). While collective guilt reflects a concern with maintaining a moral group identity and is associated with actions aimed at repairing inflicted harm, moral outrage reflects a concern with upholding justice and is associated with actions aimed at punishing the harm-doer (Pagano & Huo, 2007).

Such theorizing has not considered the possibility that the very perception of culpability that moderates these distinct emotional reactions can be affected by motivated attributional processes. Drawing on recent research on scapegoating, we propose that advantaged group members’ outrage at a perceived third party harm-doer can stem, at least in part, from a motivated displacement of blame that serves to reduce elevated feelings of collective guilt for ingroup harm-doing. In an experiment testing this claim, we hypothesize that the salience of ingroup harm-doing against a disadvantaged group will predict moral outrage toward, and an associated desire to punish, a third-party perceived as a viable alternative source of that harm. We also expect the presence of such a third-party to attenuate the increased guilt and desire for reparative action normally elicited in response to salient ingroup harm-doing.

Collective guilt and retributive action

Collective guilt is a self-focused emotional response that can be evoked by the perception that one’s ingroup has perpetrated illegitimate...
harm against another group. Research shows that reminding people of harm-doing committed by their ingroup against members of another group can induce feelings of collective guilt, even in the absence of any personal responsibility for the harm-doing (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Because collective guilt is an aversive emotional state that marks a perceived moral value threat, it increases intentions to restore a moral identity by repairing the damage done, either symbolically through apology or concretely by improving outcomes for the victimized group (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Hoffman, 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty et al., 2005; Stewart, Latu, Branscombe, & Denney, 2010).

However, because reparative actions are typically costly and require an acknowledgement of wrongdoing, individuals often prefer alternative means of evading guilt. Common strategies include seeking to legitimate or minimize the harm done by one’s ingroup (e.g., Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010). Importantly, this research has not considered the role of third parties and their potential to be perceived as alternative sources of the disadvantaged group’s harm.

Moral outrage and reparative action

Moral outrage is an other-focused emotional response that can be evoked by the perception that a third party outgroup has perpetrated illegitimate harm against another outgroup (Thomas et al., 2009). Outrage is characterized by anger directed at the perceived third-party perpetrator and is felt on behalf of those unjustly harmed (Haidt, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Vidmar, 2000). As an emotional experience that marks a perceived threat to the moral status quo, outrage motivates efforts to intervene in the name of restoring justice. Moral outrage is often associated with a desire to take reparative action against a third-party perpetrator to restore justice on behalf of disadvantaged groups (Haidt, 2003; Vidmar, 2000). For instance, Pagano and Huo (2007) found that American participants’ moral outrage toward Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein over harm caused to Iraqi citizens predicted support for intense efforts to punish Hussein on behalf of the Iraqis.

The prevailing notion that outrage at a third party harm-doer reflects an underlying concern with justice for the disadvantaged has led to important insights. However, research has yet to examine whether the very perception of third party culpability can reflect a motivated attribution of blame. This possibility gains plausibility from recent research on scapegoating.

Scapegoating: shifting ingroup culpability to a third-party perpetrator

Broadly defined, scapegoating is the tendency to blame a person or a group for a negative outcome that is due, at least in large part, to other causes (Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keeler, 2012). Although early perspectives described scapegoating as a strategy used by frustrated groups to justify the release of aggression against innocent minorities (Allport, 1954; Berkowitz, 1989; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939), more recent accounts suggest that scapegoating serves to minimize threats posed by other causal explanations for a negative outcome (Douglas, 1995; Rothschild et al., 2012). For example, Rothschild et al. (2012) tested the hypothesis that people engage in scapegoating to protect their moral identity when they are confronted with responsibility for a harmful outcome. They found that reminders of personal or collective culpability for an environmental hazard led participants to blame scapegoat targets (e.g., large corporations) for the harm done. This effect was mediated by increased feelings of personal guilt (Study 1), and was eliminated if participants were given the opportunity to affirm their moral value in an unrelated domain (Study 2).

In a third study, Rothschild et al. (2012) manipulated participants’ ability to scapegoat in response to reminders of ingroup harm-doing. According to Glick (2005), to displace blame onto an outgroup, individuals must perceive that group to be a “viable” scapegoat target — that is, capable of having caused the negative outcome in question. Glick (2005) proposed that people rely on prevalent ideologies and beliefs to determine a group’s viability in connection with a given negative outcome. For example, due to the widespread belief that fossil fuel consumption contributes to climate change (Two new polls on climate change, 2012), a group perceived to consume large amounts of fossil fuel would likely serve as a viable scapegoat target for the negative effects of climate change, whereas a group perceived to consume little fossil fuel would represent a nonviable scapegoat target for that outcome. Accordingly, Rothschild et al. presented participants with the opportunity to attribute blame over harmful climate change to either a viable scapegoat target (oil companies) or a nonviable scapegoat target (the Amish). Among participants previously reminded of their ingroup’s contribution to climate change, the opportunity to blame a viable scapegoat target, but not a nonviable target, reduced feelings of guilt and, consequently, reduced willingness to engage in reparative action.

Thus, prior research indicates that the salience of ingroup harm-doing can elicit feelings of collective guilt and motivate efforts to restore the moral identity of one’s group by means of reparative action, but the opportunity to displace blame for that harm onto a viable scapegoat reduces guilt and, consequently, decreases motivation to engage in reparative action. Yet this prior work has not examined the consequences of scapegoating on peoples’ emotional responses or behavioral intentions toward the scapegoat target, or how such responses may be linked to the feelings of guilt that drive this process. The current research aims to fill this gap by focusing on moral outrage and endorsement of reparative action toward the scapegoat target.

Current research

Scapegoating research suggests a novel perspective on the origins of moral outrage (in some situations) by revealing how people reduce collective guilt over ingroup harm-doing by shifting culpability for that harm to a third-party perpetrator. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the opportunity to displace blame for salient ingroup harm-doing onto a viable third-party scapegoat would predict increased feelings of moral outrage against the scapegoated group. Support for this hypothesis would suggest that, at least sometimes, advantaged group members’ outrage at a third party for illegitimately harming a disadvantaged group may ultimately be driven, not by concerns with justice, but by the same concern with moral identity maintenance that underlies feelings of collective guilt. Our claim that scapegoating can serve to channel self-focused feelings of collective guilt into other-focused feelings of moral outrage yields an additional novel hypothesis: when ingroup harm-doing is salient, we should observe a “hydraulic” relationship between collective guilt and moral outrage, such that heightened feelings of outrage are associated with decreased guilt.

The current study tested these hypotheses experimentally. We manipulated the purported cause of the economic hardship of working-class Americans (a disadvantaged outgroup), priming one group of participants with information that their ingroup (middle class Americans) or another outgroup (upper class Americans) was responsible for perpetrating harm against the working class. To test whether the predicted emotional and behavioral effects of scapegoating are specifically driven by heightened moral value concerns, we also included a comparison condition shown in previous research to evoke scapegoating in the absence of a moral value threat (Rothschild et al., 2012). A third group of participants were primed with information that the cause of working-class harm was unknown. Rothschild and colleagues found that this causally indeterminate
portrayal of a negative outcome increases scapegoating as a function of decreased feelings of personal control, but – critically – does not affect participants’ feelings of guilt. Since moral identity and personal control concerns operate as psychologically independent routes to scapegoating, we would expect a portrayal of the causes of working-class harm as unknown to elicit scapegoating, but – unlike an ingroup harm portrayal – to have no effect on feelings of collective guilt or moral outrage.

We then manipulated whether a potential scapegoat target – in this case, illegal immigrants – was portrayed as a viable or nonviable alternative source of harm against the working class. As noted earlier, people draw on prevalent ideologies and beliefs to determine a group’s viability as a scapegoat (Glick, 2005). Many theories stress that people’s tendency to see illegal immigrants as causing the economic plight of working-class Americans is grounded in the widespread belief that the financial gains of illegal immigrants come at the loss of working-class Americans (see Cole, 2003; Esses, Brochu, & Dickson, 2012; Paral, 2009). Importantly, this zero-sum belief implies that illegal immigrants’ viability as a scapegoat hinges on the perception that immigrants have made economic gains. As such, we manipulated illegal immigrants’ perceived viability as a scapegoat for working-class harm by manipulating whether immigrants were portrayed as being economically successful or unsuccessful.

Based on our 3 (Purported cause of working-class harm: ingroup vs. unknown vs. outgroup) × 2 (Scapegoat target viability: viable vs. non-viable) between-subjects design, we arrived at the following hypotheses (see Fig. 1 for a graphic depiction of our hypotheses):

**Hypothesis 1.** Participants confronted with ingroup culpability or with unknown causes for working-class harm will assign more blame to a viable than to a non-viable scapegoat target; participants confronted with outgroup culpability will not assign blame to a potential scapegoat, irrespective of its viability.

**Hypothesis 2a.** Participants confronted with ingroup culpability for working-class harm will (a) experience more moral outrage toward immigrants and will (b) be more likely to support retributive actions against immigrants if immigrants are portrayed as viable compared to non-viable scapegoats; participants confronted with outgroup culpability or unknown causes for working-class harm will be less outraged and less inclined to support retribution against immigrants, irrespective of scapegoat viability. The effect of culpability (ingroup vs. other causes) on retribution in the viable scapegoat condition will be mediated by moral outrage, but not by collective guilt.

**Hypothesis 2b.** Participants confronted with ingroup culpability for working-class harm will (a) experience more collective guilt and will (b) be more likely to support reparative actions for the working class if immigrants are portrayed as non-viable compared to viable scapegoats; participants confronted with outgroup culpability or unknown causes for working-class harm will be less likely to experience collective guilt or to support reparative actions toward the working class, irrespective of scapegoat viability. The effect of culpability (ingroup vs. other causes) on reparation in the nonviable scapegoat condition will be mediated by collective guilt, but not by moral outrage.

**Hypothesis 3.** Given the expected “hydraulic relationship” between collective guilt and moral outrage, these two emotions are expected to be negatively correlated in the ingroup cause condition. Likewise, support for reparative actions against immigrants should be negatively related to support for reparative actions for the working class in the ingroup cause condition.

**Hypothesis 4.** Although participants confronted with unknown causes for working-class harm will assign more blame to a viable (than to non-viable) scapegoat (see **Hypothesis 1**), this effect will be unrelated to moral outrage, collective guilt, retribution against immigrants, or reparations for the working class.

**Fig. 1.** The hypothesized effects of purported cause of working-class harm and scapegoat viability on attributions of blame, moral outrage, collective guilt, retributive action, or reparative action.
Method

One-hundred and thirty-three American undergraduates (65 female) received course credit for participation. As a cover story, the study was described as a survey of social and economic attitudes.

Procedure

Self-categorization induction

First participants completed a fabricated social class questionnaire designed to induce self-categorization as middle-class Americans. Each questionnaire item was worded to maximize the likelihood that participants would select the answer marked with a middle-class, as opposed to a lower- or upper-class, category label (e.g., “My education following high school is best characterized as: a) none [working-class]; b) public university [middle-class]; c) private university [upper-class]”). After this induction, participants responded to a single-item categorization check in which they indicated whether they were best characterized as working class, middle class, or upper class. Twelve respondents did not categorize themselves as middle class and were thus excluded from all further analyses, leaving a final sample size of 121 (62 female).

Purported cause of working-class harm

Next, all participants read an ostensible news article entitled “The Plight of Working-Class Americans.” The first section of this article was identical across conditions and described the economic hardships experienced by working-class Americans, including high unemployment and wage stagnation. The second section, entitled “Who’s to Blame?” differed across conditions.

In the ingroup cause condition, this section identified middle-class Americans as the primary cause of the suffering of the working class. The article concluded by stating that “The bottom line is that prioritizing price and chasing the cheapest deals has benefited the pocketbooks of middle-class Americans while leading to severe unemployment and crippling wage stagnation among working-class Americans.” In the unknown cause condition, this section of the article stated that economists are currently unable to determine the cause of the suffering of the working class. The article concluded, “The bottom line is that the severe unemployment and crippling wage stagnation among working-class Americans is a crisis without a clear cause.” In the outgroup cause condition, this section of the article was nearly identical to the corresponding section of the article in the ingroup cause condition except that upper-class Americans, rather than middle-class Americans, were identified as the primary cause of the working-class suffering.

Scapegoat target viability

Participants were then presented with another (experimenter-fabricated) news article about the current status of illegal immigrants in America. In the viable scapegoat condition, the article, entitled “Illegal Immigrants Successful in Economic Slump,” described increased employment and income among illegal immigrants and concluded by stating that, “the economic conditions for illegal immigrants have vastly improved over the last decade and they are doing quite well in today’s difficult economic climate.” In the nonviable scapegoat condition, the article, entitled “Illegal Immigrants Suffer in Economic Slump,” described decreased employment and income among illegal immigrants and concluded by stating that, “the economic conditions for illegal immigrants have rapidly deteriorated over the last decade, a trend that seems to be continuing even more rapidly in today’s difficult economic climate.”

Moral outrage

We used Pagano and Huo’s (2007) 6-item measure of felt moral outrage toward a third party for perpetrating harm against a victimized outgroup, but modified the items to refer to anger at illegal immigrants on behalf of work-class Americans. Two sample items were: “Thinking about the situation working-class Americans have endured due to illegal immigrants makes me angry on their behalf” and “Knowing that illegal immigrants, working-class Americans, were probably helpless against illegal immigrants makes me angry on their behalf” (α = .95).

Collective guilt

We used 3 items from a scale used by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) to measure felt guilt over illegitimate ingroup harm-doing, but modified the items to refer to the harm perpetrated against working-class Americans. Specifically, participants rated the degree to which they, as middle-class Americans, felt guilty, regretful, and apologetic for the harm the middle class has caused working-class Americans (α = .94).

The next two questionnaires assessed participants’ willingness to support or engage in, retributive and reparative actions. These measures, too, were counterbalanced in order of presentation and responses were also made on a 7-point scale.

Support for retributive action

Participants completed a modified version of a 6-item measure used in previous research to assess the desire to punish a third-party perpetrator for harming a victimized outgroup (Pagano & Huo, 2007). Specifically, participants rated their level of agreement with statements advocating the punishment of illegal immigrants for harm done to working-class Americans: e.g., “Illegal immigrants should face harsher punishments for the harm they cause lower-class Americans; Whatever the cost, illegal immigrants must be brought to justice for unjustly hurting working-class Americans” (α = .92).

Support for reparative action

Participants completed a 4-item measure comprised of items used previously to assess willingness to support and engage in actions to repair ingroup perpetrated harm (Pagano & Huo, 2007; Rothschild et al., 2012). Specifically, participants rated their level of agreement with statements advocating actions to repair the harm done to working-class Americans: e.g., “Middle-class Americans should make more of an effort to relieve the harm done to the working class; In order to repair the harm done to working-class Americans I would be personally willing to spend more money on my every day purchases” (α = .77).

Results

Scores on all dependent measures were submitted to a 3 (Purported cause of working-class harm: ingroup cause vs. unknown cause vs. outgroup cause) × 2 (Scapegoat target viability: viable vs. nonviable) between-subjects ANOVA. We first tested the basic scapegoating effect and then examined the predicted effects for each emotion and its associated action outcome in separate mediated moderation models. Afterwards, we examined the correlations between both

1 Preliminary analyses including order of intergroup emotion and action measures as between-subjects factors revealed no effects involving these variables, so we omitted them to simplify presentation.
our emotion measures and between our action intention measures (i.e., the predicted ‘hydraulic’ relationships).

**Scapegoating**

We obtained a two-way interaction on scapegoating scores, $F(2, 115) = 5.31, p = .006$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$. Supporting **Hypothesis 1**, pairwise comparisons revealed that when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target, participants blamed them more for the plight of working-class Americans both in the ingroup cause condition ($M = 3.65, SD = 1.37$), $F(1, 115) = 9.30, p = .003$, and the unknown cause condition ($M = 3.24, SD = 1.55$), $F(1, 115) = 3.95, p = .04$, compared to participants in the outgroup cause condition ($M = 2.48, SD = .87$). Mean scapegoating scores did not significantly differ between the ingroup cause and unknown cause conditions ($F = 1.14, p = .29$). When illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target, attributions of blame did not differ as a function of the salient cause of working-class Americans’ suffering ($F$s < 1.93, $ps > .16$).

Also supporting **Hypothesis 1**, within the ingroup cause condition, participants attributed more blame to illegal immigrants for the suffering of the working-class when immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target ($M = 3.65, SD = 1.37$) compared when they were portrayed to nonviable scapegoat target ($M = 2.03, SD = .89$; $F(1, 115) = 17.69$, $p < .001$). Similarly, in the unknown cause condition, more blame was attributed to illegal immigrants in the viable scapegoat target condition ($M = 3.24, SD = 1.55$) compared to the nonviable scapegoat target condition ($M = 2.31, SD = 1.00$; $F(1, 115) = 6.38, p = .01$). In the outgroup cause condition, means scores did not differ between the viable scapegoat condition ($M = 2.48, SD = .87$) and nonviable scapegoat condition ($M = 2.57, SD = 1.16$; $F < 1.00, p > .82$).

**Moral outrage and retributive action**

**Moral outrage**

We obtained a two-way interaction, $F(2, 115) = 5.05, p = .008$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$. Pairwise comparisons and the pattern of means depicted in Fig. 2a show, in line with **Hypothesis 2a**, that when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target, participants in the ingroup cause condition reported more moral outrage at illegal immigrants for harming working-class Americans ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.60$) compared to participants in the unknown cause condition ($M = 3.16, SD = 1.34$; $F(1, 115) = 3.83, p = .05$) and the outgroup cause condition ($M = 2.79, SD = 1.10$; $F(1, 115) = 8.58, p = .004$). Mean moral outrage scores did not differ between the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($F < 1.00, p < .39$). When illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target, moral outrage scores did not differ between the cause conditions ($F$s < 2.25, $ps > .14$).

Also supporting **Hypothesis 2a**, in the ingroup cause condition, participants reported more moral outrage when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.60$) versus a nonviable scapegoat target ($M = 2.19, SD = 1.41$; $F(1, 115) = 17.14, p < .001$). Mean moral outrage scores did not differ as a function of target viability in the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($F$s < 1.00, $ps > .33$).

Consistent with prior research on scapegoating (Rothschild et al., 2012), these findings provide support for **Hypothesis 4**. Specifically, while an unknown causal portrayal of working-class harm increased participants tendency to blame a viable (vs. non-viable) scapegoat, it had no effect on participants’ self-reported moral outrage.

**Support for retributive action**

We obtained a two-way interaction, $F(2, 115) = 3.81, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .06$. Supporting **Hypothesis 2a**, the pattern of means depicted in Fig. 2b reveal that when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target, participants in the ingroup cause condition reported more punitiveness against illegal immigrants for harming working-class Americans ($M = 4.08, SD = 1.66$) compared to participants in the unknown cause condition ($M = 3.14, SD = 1.36$; $F(1, 115) = 4.09, p = .04$) and the outgroup cause condition ($M = 2.84, SD = 1.32$; $F(1, 115) = 7.01, p = .01$). Mean punitiveness scores did not significantly differ between the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($F < 1.00, p > .51$). When illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target, punitiveness scores did not differ between the cause conditions ($F$s < 1.53, $ps > .22$).

Also supporting **Hypothesis 2a**, in the ingroup cause condition, participants reported more punitiveness when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target ($M = 4.08, SD = 1.66$) versus a nonviable scapegoat target ($M = 2.44, SD = 1.59$; $F(1, 115) = 12.45, p < .001$). Mean punitiveness scores did not differ as a function of target viability in the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($F$s < 1.00, $ps > .42$). The null effects on retribution scores in the unknown cause condition are consistent with **Hypothesis 4**.

**Mediation analyses**

Next we tested the predicted mediation described in **Hypothesis 2a**: that the combined effect of ingroup culpability and scapegoat viability
on support for retributive action would be mediated by moral outrage, but not by collective guilt. Using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure, we regressed reparative action scores onto the interaction of cause condition (coded: ingroup cause = 1; unknown cause = 0; outgroup cause = 0) and scapegoat viability (coded: viable = 1; nonviable = 0) with moral outrage and collective guilt scores entered as the potential mediators, and our main effects as covariates. Five-thousand bootstrap resamples were performed. The 95% confidence interval obtained for the indirect effects of the Cause condition × Scapegoat viability interaction on retributive scores through moral outrage did not contain zero (.42, 1.89). In contrast, the indirect effects of the interaction on punitiveness through collective guilt did contain zero (−.26, .34). These results are consistent with our mediated moderation hypothesis that the increase in participants’ punitiveness in the ingroup cause/viable scapegoat condition is mediated by the corresponding increase in feelings of moral outrage, but not by variations in collective guilt (see Fig. 3 for a graphical depiction).

We also tested the conditional indirect effects of the cause manipulation by separately regressing retributive action scores onto cause condition within each viability condition, with moral outrage as the proposed mediator. Results revealed that the indirect effect of cause condition on retributive scores through moral outrage did not contain zero in the viable scapegoat condition (.17, 1.33), but did contain zero in the nonviable scapegoat condition (−.82, .11). These results indicate that in the presence of a viable scapegoat target, salient ingroup harm-doing indirectly evoked increased support for retributive action through increased feelings of moral outrage.

Collective guilt and retributive action

Collective guilt

We obtained a two-way interaction, $F(2, 115) = 4.21, p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. Supporting Hypothesis 2b, the pattern of means depicted in Fig. 4a revealed that when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target, participants in the ingroup cause condition reported more collective guilt when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.40$) versus a viable scapegoat target ($M = 2.08, SD = .81$), $F(1, 115) = 5.87, p = .01$. Mean collective guilt scores did not differ as a function of target viability within the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($Fs < 2.70, ps > .10$). The null effects within the unknown cause condition are consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Support for reparative action

We obtained a two-way interaction, $F(2, 115) = 3.10, p = .05$, partial $\eta^2 = .07$. Supporting Hypothesis 2b, the pattern of means depicted in Fig. 4b revealed that when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target, participants in the ingroup cause condition reported more support for reparative actions when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target ($M = 2.60, SD = 1.31; F(1, 115) = 7.81, p = .01$) and the outgroup cause condition ($M = 2.75, SD = 1.00; F(1, 115) = 5.78, p = .02$). Mean reparation scores did not differ between the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($F < 1.00, p = .70$). When illegal immigrants were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target, reparative scores did not differ between the cause conditions ($Fs < 1.00, ps > .43$). Also supporting Hypothesis 2b, in the ingroup cause condition, participants reported more collective guilt when illegal immigrants were portrayed as a nonviable scapegoat target ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.40$) versus a viable scapegoat target ($M = 2.08, SD = .81$), $F(1, 115) = 5.87, p = .01$. Mean collective guilt scores did not differ as a function of target viability within the unknown cause and outgroup cause conditions ($Fs < 2.70, ps > .10$). The null effects within the unknown cause condition are consistent with Hypothesis 4.

Mediation analyses

Next we tested the predicted mediation described in Hypothesis 2b: that the combined effect of ingroup culpability and scapegoat viability on support for reparative action would be mediated by collective guilt, but not by moral outrage. Using Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping procedure, we regressed reparative action scores onto the interaction of cause condition (coded: ingroup cause = 1; unknown cause = 0; outgroup cause = 0) and scapegoat viability (coded: viable = 1; nonviable = 0) with collective guilt and moral outrage scores entered as the potential mediators, and our main effects as covariates. Five-thousand bootstrap resamples were performed. The 95% confidence interval obtained for the indirect effects of the Cause condition × Scapegoat viability interaction on support for reparative action through moral outrage and collective guilt.

**Note:** All path coefficients represent standardized regression weights. *$p < .05$.*

**Fig. 3.** Indirect effect of Cause condition × Scapegoat viability interaction on support for retributive action through moral outrage and collective guilt.
condition × Scapegoat viability interaction on reparative action scores through collective guilt did not contain zero (−1.01, −0.18). In contrast, the indirect effects of the interaction on reparative action through moral outrage did contain zero (−0.52, 0.04). These results are consistent with our mediated moderation hypothesis that the decrease in participants' self-reported willingness to engage in reparative action in the ingroup cause/viable scapegoat condition is mediated by the corresponding decrease in feelings of collective guilt but not by variations in moral outrage (see Fig. 5).

We also tested the conditional indirect effects of the cause manipulation by separately regressing reparative action scores onto cause condition within each viability condition, with collective guilt as the proposed mediator. Results revealed that the indirect effect of cause condition on reparative action scores through collective guilt did not contain zero in the nonviable scapegoat condition (0.12, 0.96), but did contain zero in the viable scapegoat condition (−0.21, 0.19). These results indicate that in the absence of a viable scapegoat target, salient ingroup harm-doing indirectly evoked increased support for reparative action through increased feelings of collective guilt.

"Hydraulic" relationship between moral outrage and collective guilt

Finally, we conducted correlational analyses to assess the possible hydraulic relationship between feelings of moral outrage and collective guilt in response to salient ingroup harm-doing. Although the overall correlation between outrage and guilt was not significant (see Table 1), significant relationships did emerge within the different cause conditions. Specifically, supporting Hypothesis 3, in the ingroup cause condition, moral outrage was negatively correlated with collective guilt, r(35) = −0.33, p = .05. In contrast, consistent with previous research (Pagano & Huo, 2007), moral outrage and collective guilt were positively correlated in both the unknown cause condition, r(40) = 0.31, p = .04, and outgroup cause condition, r(40) = 0.34, p = .03. Similarly, in support of Hypothesis 3, correlational analyses revealed a significant negative relationship between retributive and reparative action scores within the ingroup cause condition, r(35) = −0.34, p = .04. In contrast, retributive and reparative action scores were unrelated in the unknown and outgroup cause conditions (ps > .73).

General discussion

Integrating prior research on collective moral emotions and scapegoating, we proposed that, in some contexts at least, moral outrage at an outgroup perceived to be unjustly harming another outgroup may not represent a genuine concern with justice, but rather a motivated displacement of blame that serves to protect one's own moral identity by reducing collective guilt over ingroup harm-doing. Based on this claim, we hypothesized that when advantaged group members are

Note: All path coefficients represent standardized regression weights.

* p < .05
motivated to reduce feelings of collective guilt over their own group’s responsibility for Illegitimately harming a disadvantaged group, the ability to displace blame onto a third party would evoke feelings of moral outrage against the third party scapegoat. We also hypothesized that scapegoating in response to ingroup harm-doing would differentially increase punitiveness and decrease reparations through these separate emotional processes. Based on our claim that blaming a third-party for ingroup harm-doing channels feelings of guilt into feelings of outrage, we expected that when ingroup harm-doing was salient, collective guilt would be inversely related to moral outrage, and retributive action intentions would be inversely related to reparative action intentions. Importantly, insofar as these emotional and behavioral effects are driven by heightened moral value concerns, we predicted that increased scapegoating in the absence of a moral value threat would be unrelated to participants’ moral outrage, collective guilt, retribution against immigrants, or reparations for the working class.

Consistent with previous scapegoating research (Rothschild et al., 2012), we found that framing working-class harm as due to either ingroup actions or unknown causes both increased participants’ tendency to blame illegal immigrants when they were portrayed as a viable scapegoat target. However, in support of our primary hypotheses, the present study found that only when participants were reminded of their ingroup’s culpability (but not outgroup culpability or unknown culpability) for working-class harm did a portrayal of illegal immigrants as a viable (vs. nonviable) source of this harm-doing increase moral outrage at illegal immigrants and decrease feelings of collective guilt. Furthermore, for participants confronted with a viable scapegoat, the effect of ingroup culpability on retribution was mediated by moral outrage; whereas for participants confronted with a non-viable scapegoat, the effect of ingroup culpability on reparation was mediated by collective guilt. Also as predicted, when ingroup harm-doing was salient, collective guilt and moral outrage were negatively correlated, as were retributive and reparative action intentions.

The literature on collective guilt has cataloged a variety of cognitive strategies people use to avoid or minimize felt guilt over their ingroup’s illegitimate harm-doing (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). In line with Rothschild et al. (2012), results of the current study show that shifting ingroup culpability onto a third-party perpetrator represents a largely unexplored guilt-reduction strategy with a unique set of characteristics and consequences. Unlike other guilt-avoidance strategies that can result in the denigration of the victimized group such as dehumanization (Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008), displacing responsibility for ingroup-perpetrated harm was shown to provoke hostility towards a third party. Future research should examine the factors that influence ingroup members’ preference for one of these strategies over the other. Our findings suggest that one such factor is the availability of a viable scapegoat target. Perhaps when such a target is not available, ingroup members are less likely to shift blame, and prefer instead to minimize or rationalize the harm their group has caused as a means of protecting their moral identity.

In much of the existing intergroup emotions literature moral outrage is lauded as a prosocial emotion provoked by perceived injustice which can motivate bystanders to take action on behalf of victimized groups (Lodewijks, Kersten, & van Zomeren, 2008; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). While moral outrage may indeed have these benefits in some situations, the results of the current study support an alternative and sobering account of the justice motive of moral outrage and its associated action within the context of scapegoating. The present study demonstrates that moral outrage can be motivated by an attempt to shift ingroup culpability to a viable third-party outgroup. This amplification of moral outrage explains participants’ increased punitiveness toward the scapegoat (i.e., illegal immigrants). However, when participants are faced with a situation where there is no viable scapegoat target and their ingroup is culpable of harm doing, this results in feelings of collective guilt and greater reparative action support. This evidence calls into question claims that feelings of moral outrage are more effective at promoting prosocial behavior than feelings of collective guilt (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003). Furthermore, the current findings suggest that at least in certain contexts, feelings of collective guilt and feelings of moral outrage may ultimately be driven by the same underlying concern; namely, protecting the ingroup’s moral identity.

The present research also provides initial evidence of a hydraulic relationship between collective guilt and moral outrage which supports our novel account of scapegoating. Specifically, the correlational evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the ability to displace blame for ingroup harm-doing onto a third-party scapegoat serves as a mechanism for redirecting self-focused feelings of guilt into other-focused feelings of outrage. However, while the evidence is certainly consistent with this claim, the current study’s design limits our ability to draw firm conclusions about this process. Future research should use a multiple time-point design to directly test the proposed hydraulic relationship between guilt and outrage in the context of scapegoating.

The irony of the present findings is that moral outrage in the present study arguably ensures the maintenance of the status quo of disadvantaged group’s suffering, while providing advantaged group members with an air of self-righteousness. That is, outraged advantaged group members may punish a supposed third-party culprit in the name of restoring justice for a disadvantaged group while simultaneously continuing to perpetrate harm against the disadvantaged without repair. Stated differently, there is the appearance of justice being served only to ensure that injustice is preserved. We are not claiming that a genuine concern for justice does not at times facilitate moral outrage. Rather we seek to illuminate those circumstances where the motives for restoration of justice are not as noble as they first appear and, more importantly, that this alternative motivational account might work towards the maintenance of injustice. It is up to future research to find ways of disentangling “genuine” justice-driven outrage from the kind of guilt-driven outrage observed in the current study.

**Acknowledgments**

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**References**


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**Table 1**

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<th>Measured variables</th>
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<th>3</th>
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Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Displacing blame over the ingroup's harming of a disadvantaged group can fuel moral outrage at a third-party scapegoat. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.05.005