

Question 4. Take a “story”—this can either be an academic or journalistic account, and can come from either a single source or a composite—that explains some major event in international behavior (for example, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe; the Asian currency crisis of 1997; the “clash of civilizations”). Identify two or more hypotheses or propositions embedded within this, and outline how you would go about systematically studying these. Your answer should include a discussion of how the study you have proposed satisfies the criteria (or at least some of them) of Gerring and King, Keohane & Verba.

“European Defense Unity: Future Reality or Field of Dreams?”:

A Look at Implicit and Explicit Propositions

What does the future have in store for European collective security? The Treaty of European Union (TEU), signed by member states in Maastricht in February 1992, established the European Union (EU) not only as a community of economic and social interests but also of security. In including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of three essential ‘pillars’, the EU has put on paper three eventual goals or benchmarks: the creation of a common foreign policy followed by a common defense and, eventually, an integration of defense industries and forces¹. Bonnie Gold, in her article “European Defense Unity: Future Reality or Field of Dreams?”, sees many problems in implementing the CFSP, mainly due to the member states’ unwillingness to sacrifice national interests in order to successfully pursue collective goals².

Case studies like Gold’s often contain many implicit as well as explicit propositions. Explicitly, she tries to show that the Gulf (before CFSP) and Yugoslav (after CFSP) wars demonstrate that the CFSP is ineffectual in and of itself to counteract or reduce member state unilateralism³. Implicitly, she is affirming that the fundamental concepts of security embodied in the CFSP are correct⁴. With one major exception, we will see that her argument does a good job of satisfying many of the criteria established for a successful scientific case study as laid down by John Gerring’s Social Science

Methodology and Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba's (KKV) Designing Social Inquiry^{5 6}.

KKV make a clear distinction between qualitative and quantitative analysis based on the number of observations⁷. Her analysis is narrative and qualitative rather than statistical and quantitative, as she attempts to use a few instances over a relatively small time period to plumb the depths of the CFSP and its practical application⁸. The first section of Gold's case study analyzes the security policies set down in the TEU and what the concessions and compromises suggest in terms of the give-and-take between state interests and collective action⁹. The second compares the spirit and letter of the CFSP to actual action taken by the European Union¹⁰ states in the Gulf and Yugoslav wars¹¹. Finally, she offers a few recommendations on how to salvage the intentions of the TEU and create a more fertile ground for the eventual growth of a common defense unity in Europe¹².

In the first section of Gold's paper one can detect her implicit proposition concerning assumptions of 'security' in the CFSP. Gold is asserting that the CFSP's basic assumptions of security, including the need for individual governments to eventually pool defense power, are more or less the proper starting point for the European Union¹³. She agrees with its initial wording and intentions, and believes that, properly implemented, the CFSP could amount to a very significant change for the better as far as eventually coordinating a European defense unity¹⁴. Although agreeing to the general model of security in the CFSP may seem commonsensical (and this is why the argument remains largely implicit) other authors may define "European security" as primarily

economic or social in nature, relegating the actual military and foreign policy defense apparatus and CFSP to a secondary consideration.

Gerring's typology of empirical propositions further categorizes all scientific propositions or assertions as descriptive, classificatory, predictive, or causal in nature¹⁵. Gold's primary proposition, on the other hand, is a causal inference, yet contains predictive elements as well. For Gold, the problem is not that the fundamental definitions and goals of security in the TEU need to be radically altered, but that the successful application of these fundamentals is nearly impossible given, among other things, the continued primacy of member state interests in the form of the many 'opt-out' clauses institutionalized in the TEU¹⁶. Moreover, without a major overhaul of this weak and fragmented system, the problems are expected to continue; hence the additional predictive nature of her argument¹⁷.

To test her theory about the ineffectiveness of the CFSP, she looks at conflicts before and after its creation. The pre-TEU Gulf crisis (1990-1991) saw a weak and divided European response, exacerbated by member state unilateralism¹⁸. The TEU (1992) set out to solve these divisions through the CFSP. All member states signed this treaty after securing many opt-outs, ostensibly to protect national security interests¹⁹. The Yugoslav conflict (1991-1992) was the first conflict present after the signing of the TEU, and despite the lofty language of multilateralism in the CFSP, once again the European response was deeply divided and shot through with streaks of unilateralism²⁰. The independent variable in her analysis is the CFSP as created by the member states, and her dependent variable is the overall European response to international security crises. Gerring would most likely identify these variables as dichotomous ordinal

variables, because there is a simple present/absent relationship (i.e. present/absent CFSP, present/absent unified European policy response)²¹. It is therefore rather easy, by following Gold's causal mechanism, to see changes caused by the addition of the CFSP.

Her 'N' is relatively small in both space and time, encompassing only European security directly before and after the TEU²². In selecting the Gulf and then Yugoslav crises, "European Defense Unity" is employing what Gerring calls a 'crucial case' method of case study²³. Both of these crises represent highly visible, highly important tests of the capacity of European security action – tests that would therefore appear to offer the clearest results. If the security response was clearly unified, or even *significantly more* unified in the Yugoslav crisis than in the Gulf crisis, then her theory would absolutely be false. However, the foreign policy responses of member states were again incoherent and disunited, showing her theory to be correct, at least throughout the Yugoslav crisis²⁴.

Causal propositions include a number of pitfalls to be avoided. Gold does well in following the five basic rules according to KKV. First, one should construct a theory with a high degree of falsifiability, in other words, so that it would be easy to determine if the theory is wrong²⁵. Although there could be much argument concerning what consists of a *successful* 'unified' European response, the *presence or absence* of any unified response is less equivocal. Her theory is internally consistent, as she is careful to frame all security issues in the same terms as those laid down in the CFSP. The outcome or dependent variables of multilateral action/unilateral action are in fact dependent on implementation of the ideals laid down in the CFSP, since the CFSP was designed to help diminish member state unilateralism²⁶. The selected variables are fairly concrete

according to KKV, as their outcomes are based on observable common action, not intentions or motives²⁷. Although it could be argued that the CFSP in the end represents more an intention than anything concrete, the fact that states signed the treaty and are actively working on the CFSP elevates this intention to the realm of action as well. Finally, her theory can potentially be extended to many other issues in international politics, as member state defection problems are endemic to all collective security arrangements²⁸.

Gold's limited selection of tests proves to be the major weakness in this study. Although it is perhaps powerful to show the similarity between the Gulf and Yugoslav responses, it can also be argued that the CFSP was simply too young to be implemented properly²⁹. KKV would likely have serious problems with Gold's case study in this area, as they advocate the maximization of observations to secure the argument for causal inference³⁰. Specifically, by using only the Yugoslav case to show the total inadequacy of the CFSP, Gold runs into a fundamental problem of causal inference. This fundamental problem, which KKV are particularly worried about, is that no matter how much data one collects, a causal inference can never be *proven*³¹.

Therefore, KKV recommend against crucial case studies, as they by nature have only a few variables, and are therefore not as strong as arguments that consider a wider sample size³². To strengthen her case, Gold should have increased the number of observations, either across space or across time. Of course, this would have been very difficult to do at the time of her writing, and she was apparently concerned with an initial appraisal of CFSP viability. In the absence of other 'real world' test variables, she could also have posited additional counterfactual cases. Counterfactuals are thought-

experiments – cases that are conceivable and logically consistent but have not happened yet³³. To further test the CFSP in a thought-experiment, Gold could have run through the logical chain of events given, for example, a military coup in Turkey, or an escalation of violence in Northern Ireland. Both of these events would have serious security implications for the EU and would rub against conflicting loyalties between member states.

Apart from this problem, Gold does a good job in her primary argument of satisfying the social science methodology criteria laid down by Gerring, King, Keohane, and Verba. It is well thought out, logically sound, testable, timely, and important. The Gulf and Yugoslav cases provide a good ‘before TEU and after CFSP’ snapshot of the state of European defense and foreign policy unity. It is important to see that she is also implicitly proposing that the ideas of collective security in the CFSP are not fundamentally flawed, but rather hampered by continued member state defection. Unfortunately for the EU, successful cooperation on security matters through the CFSP still remains a “field of dreams”.

Notes

¹ Gold, Bonnie. “European Defense Unity: Future Reality or Field of Dreams?”. in Crawford, Beverly and Peter W. Schulze, eds. European Dilemmas After Maastricht. (Berkeley, CA: Center for German and European Studies, 1993) 214

² Gold 199

³ Gold 200

⁴ Gold 200

⁵ Gerring, John. Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

⁶ King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)

⁷ King 4

⁸ Gold 199

⁹ Gold 200-204

¹⁰ For simplicity's sake, I use the term 'European Union' to represent the European Economic Community states from 1990-1995, since the composition of states in both are practically interchangeable during this period.

¹¹ Gold 204-214

¹² Gold 214-217

¹³ Council of the European Union. "The Common Foreign and Security Policy". (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001) 5

¹⁴ Gold 201-202

¹⁵ Gerring 119

¹⁶ Gold 204

¹⁷ Gold 217

¹⁸ Gold 205

¹⁹ Gold 204

²⁰ Gold 210. Germany's unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia against the wishes of the other member states is perhaps the most dramatic example.

²¹ Gerring 130. This is an instance where her analysis does beg a few questions. Most of all, how do we know a unified security response when we see one? It is much easier to identify a non-unified response than a unified response, especially since even a relatively unified response would have many states participating at different levels and with different objections and enthusiasms.

²² Crawford, Beverly and Peter W. Schulze, eds. European Dilemmas After Maastricht. (Berkeley, CA: Center for German and European Studies, 1993) iv
Gold 204-214.

²³ Gerring 219-220

²⁴ Gold 217

²⁵ King 100

²⁶ Gold 214

²⁷ King 109-110

²⁸ King 113

²⁹ Gold 218

³⁰ King 209-210

³¹ King 79

³² King 210-211

³³ Gerring 221-222